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Resumen: La historia del nativismo ha sido exhaustivamente estudiada y 
analizada. Uno de sus aspectos más controvertidos se refiere a la relación 
entre nativismo y populismo. Su naturaleza exacta no está, sin embargo, 
clara, y requiere más investigación. El principal objetivo de este artículo 
es arrojar luz sobre una cuestión que se dirige al centro mismo del debate 
actual sobre el populismo de derechas: cuál es el lugar y el papel del nati-
vismo en la movilización populista.
Abstract: The history of nativism has been exhaustively studied and 
analyzed. One of the most controversial aspects of this literature pertains to 
the relationship between nativism and populism. Its exact nature, however, 
is unclear and calls for investigation. The main objective of this article is to 
shed light on a question that goes to the very heart of the current debate on 
radical right-wing populism: namely, what is the place and role of nativism 
in populist mobilization.
The narrow victory of the proponents of a British exit from the European Union followed 
by Donald Trump’s equally narrow victory in the presidential election of 2016 have 
revived interest in a political phenomenon that has its roots in early nineteenth-century 
American history. As Cas Mudde has argued, both the Brexit and Donald Trump’s 
presidential campaign were informed by a strong dose of nativism, which he broadly 
defines as “xenophobic nationalism” (Mudde 2016). Nativism originated in the 
antebellum mass movement of the “Know Nothings” whose programmatic combination 
of anti-(political) establishment and anti-Catholic mobilization was instrumental in 
upending the Jacksonian party system (1828-1854). After the Civil War, nativism 
reemerged with a vengeance, targeting Catholics, Chinese migrant laborers, and Asian 
immigrants in general, to name but a few. 
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The history of American nativism has been 
exhaustively studied and analyzed from 
a variety of perspectives (for an excellent 
overview see McNally 2016: 35-60). 
One of the most controversial aspects of 
this literature pertains to the relationship 
between nativism and populism. A number 
of studies have shown that the electoral 
success of the antebellum Know Nothings 
was as much owed to their attacks against 
the political establishment as to their 
nativist rhetoric (Holt 1983: 162-170). 
Against that, the agrarian Populists of the 
1890s raised nativist concerns only to a 
very limited degree, while on the whole 
remaining remarkably tolerant (Nugent 
1963; Postel 2007). Revisionist historians 
have argued that even the Second Ku Klux 
Klan of the 1920s, at least in some states 
such as Indiana and California, derived 
its popularity more from its challenging 
entrenched economic and political elites 
and giving voice to popular dissatisfaction 
with the political establishment that had 
too long ignored popular interests than its 
terroristic intimidation and suppression of 
ethnic minorities (Moore 1990; Neymeyer 
1992). Finally, there was Trump’s campaign, 
which bundled anti-establishment 
ressentiments and cultural anxieties into 
a potent mobilizational force that won the 
insurgent candidate the nomination and the 
presidency (Lind 2016; Young and Jackson 
2015). Some American pundits have drawn 
parallels between the ideological mixture 
of economic populism and ethnocultural 
nationalism informing “Trumpism” and 
radical right-wing populism in Europe 
(McLaughlin 2015; Tharoor 2017). 
What this suggests is that there is a 
certain affinity between populism and 
nativism. Its exact nature, however, is 
unclear and calls for investigation. This 
is particularly urgent, given the continued 
electoral success of radical right-wing 
populist parties and movements in 
entrenched liberal democracies in Europe 
and elsewhere, which is the focus of the 
analysis that follows. 
The main objective is to shed light on a 
question that goes to the very heart of 
the current debate on radical right-wing 
populism: namely, what is the place and 
role of nativism in populist mobilization. 
On the one hand, it has been argued that 
the notion of radical right-wing populism 
is highly misleading (Rydgren 2017). As 
Yannis Stavrakakis has recently put it, 
in reality, these parties and movements 
promote an overwhelmingly “nationalist, 
xenophobic ideology with only peripheral 
and/or secondary populist elements” 
(Stavrakakis 2017: 8; for an in-depth 
discussion, see also Aslanidis 2017). In 
other words, populism is only incidental 
to the radical right, which should primarily 
be defined in terms of nativism. Against 
that, there is the notion that nativism is 
an intrinsic feature of populism, derived 
from the core of its logic. As Benjamin 
McKean has forcefully argued, populism 
is all about people using “a grievance 
to identify themselves as the authentic 
embodiment of ‘the people’ – unlike those 
other people, the group they are blaming 
for that grievance” (McKean 2016). The 
populist notion of “the people,” in turn, 
rests on “a sense of internal homogeneity,” 
which as such is necessarily opposed 
to any notion of heterogeneity and 
difference, against which the identity of 
“the people” is formed (Panizza 2005: 
17-18; see also McKean 2016a). From 
this perspective, the contemporary 
radical right’s propagation of a discourse 
that combines both populist and nativist 
tropes is not without logical coherence 
and consistency.
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1. Populism, nativism and the 
radical right
For the purpose of this paper, populism is 
defined as a political doctrine that holds 
that society is divided into two antagonistic 
groups, the vast mass of ordinary people 
(the “low”) and a relatively small elite 
(the “high”) which not only systematically 
ignores the will and wishes of the former 
but more often than not has nothing but 
contempt for them, their values and wants 
(see Ostiguy and Roberts 2016). Populism 
seeks to restore to ordinary people the 
value they deserve and to assure that 
politics once again expresses the will of 
the people (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). 
Nativism represents primarily a political 
doctrine that holds that the interests and 
the will of the native-born and inhabitants 
of long standing should reign supreme 
over those of new arrivers, and that the 
former should be accorded absolute 
priority with respect to the benefits and 
privileges citizenship accords. At the 
same time, nativism is also a nationalist 
doctrine based on the assumption that a 
nation is founded on a particular historical 
trajectory and grounded in a particular 
historically evolved culture and system 
of values that must be preserved and 
defended. This suggests that there is 
an implicit notion of cultural superiority 
inherent in nativism.
To be successful, radical right-wing 
populist movements and parties, like 
any other movement or party, have to 
construct interpretive frames that address 
unresolved social and political questions 
and problems; offer remedies to the 
problems and suggest strategies for how 
to attain them; and advance “motivational 
frames that function as prods to action” 
(Snow and Benford 1988: 199-202). 
Successful mobilization depends in 
part on the skill of these movements to 
function as “carriers and transmitters 
of mobilizing beliefs and ideas” and as 
“signifying agents” that are “actively 
engaged in the production of meaning for 
participants, antagonists, and observers” 
(Snow and Benford 1988: 198). To 
be sure, radical right-wing populists 
compete for votes and thus gain access 
to political power; success at the polls, 
however, is not necessarily the only or 
perhaps even most important objective. 
Instead, contemporary radical right-wing 
parties see themselves primarily engaged 
in fundamental ideational battles and 
classification struggles regarding the 
interpretation of key developments shaping 
today’s and tomorrow’s socioeconomic 
and sociocultural reality. The ultimate 
goal is to gain cultural hegemony, i.e., 
to attain definitional power over ideas 
and terms that are at the very center of 
public discourse, and thus establish their 
“specific vision of the social order” as the 
“natural” vision of the social order (Smith 
1994: 37).1 
It is within this context that both populist 
appeal and nativist rhetoric play a crucial 
role. Prominent radical right-wing populist 
parties, such as the Front national, 
the FPÖ, or the Lega Nord owed their 
initial success to a populist discourse 
that presented them as defenders of 
ordinary people against “the elite” and 
as advocates of their “common sense” 
and “popular instinct.” In the years that 
followed, they gradually adopted a nativist 
rhetoric that promoted them as defenders 
of the common good, as advocates of 
1. Jörg Haider, in his book from 1993, devotes 
a whole chapter to “the fight for cultural hege-
mony” (Haider 1993: 73-85).
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national sovereignty and a strict policy 
of “the native-born first,” and as the 
privileged interpreters and guardians of 
national identity. The combination of the 
two has allowed the radical populist right 
to promote a political project that appeals 
across a wide range of social categories, 
while resonating particularly among the 
lower classes. 
2. Historical antecedents
Historically, these configurations are 
hardly new. As early as the first half of 
the nineteenth century, major populist 
movements, such as the antebellum 
anti(Irish)Catholic Know Nothings in 
the United States –a movement that 
“originated at the grassroots,” not 
professional politicians– evoked nativist 
tropes in support of an anti-elite, anti-
political-establishment agenda with a 
relatively progressive slant (Holt 1973: 
313). With this program, they managed to 
appeal to the “producing classes,” such 
as journeymen, artisans and mechanics, 
united in their aversion to the competition 
from cheap immigrant labor. For a few 
years in the early 1850s, anti-Catholic, 
anti-Irish nativism became entrenched at 
the center of American politics, only to be 
superseded by the question of slavery. The 
Know Nothings disappeared as quickly as 
they had emerged; significant numbers 
joined the newly founded Republican 
Party, which, in turn, to a certain extent 
adopted anti-Catholic prejudices. 
Unlike their antebellum precursors, the 
agrarian Populists of the 1880s/1890s 
largely eschewed resorting to nativism, 
despite a strong revival of anti-Catholic, 
and a ground swell of anti-Chinese 
sentiments pervading parts of the Unites 
States at the time. Notable exceptions 
were the adoption of anti(Chinese)alien 
labor clauses in state populist platforms 
out West (largely to accommodate 
organized labor) and the appeal to anti-
British ressentiments, directed against 
English bankers, land speculators, and 
absentee landlords.2 The recourse to 
Anglophobia was guaranteed to resonate 
among American farmers, suffering 
from creeping deflation (which they 
attributed to the country’s adherence to 
the Gold Standard pushed by London 
bankers), and the ever-looming threat of 
foreclosure because of heavy mortgage 
indebtedness and tight credit. Anti-British 
nativist agitation, as far as it went, was 
supplementary to the Populists’ anti-
monopoly cause. 
Against that, in France, the Boulangist 
mobilization of the late 1880s –which 
at one point threatened to topple the 
Third Republic– engendered a first wave 
of political nativism, targeting migrant 
workers from neighbouring countries, 
such as Italy and Belgium. This was, at 
least in part, a response to the highly 
disappointing results of the parliamentary 
election of 1889, which seemed to have 
sealed the fate of Boulangism. Particularly 
Maurice Barrès, a prominent intellectual 
and writer, who had secured his seat in 
2. On occasion, populists used anti-semitic 
tropes, such as “Shylock,” in their campaign 
against bankers and the Gold Standard.  In 1896, 
William Jenning Bryan “felt the need to reassure 
a group of Jewish Democrats in Chicago” noting 
that “in denouncing ‘the financial policy advo-
cated by the Rothschilds …, we are not attack-
ing a race; we are attacking greed and avarice, 
which know neither race nor religion’.”. Bryan 
quoted in McSeveney, S. R. (1972) The Politics 
of Depression: Political Behavior in the North-
east, 1893-1896, New York, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 186-187.
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the industrial city of Nancy with a virulent 
nativist platform, established himself as 
the voice of nativist nationalism, which 
would prove highly influential in the 
decades that followed. 
In each of these cases, however, the 
relationship between populism and 
nativism was at best ambiguous. Even 
the Know Nothings, who arguably marked 
the pinnacle of the political exploitation 
of nativist sentiments in the nineteenth 
century, combined, as William Gienapp 
has noted, “bigotry with a sincere desire 
for reform” (Gienapp 1987: 93). The Know 
Nothings marketed themselves above all 
as the defenders of republicanism and its 
institutions, which they saw threatened by 
the waves of Catholic immigrants, whose 
“political souls,” prominent Know Nothing 
spokesmen such as Samuel Morse 
charged, had been “captured by despotic 
powers intent on enslaving the entire 
world” (Wilentz 1984: 268). Defending 
republicanism entailed above all asserting 
the United States as a Protestant nation 
(Cawardine 1982). For only on the soil 
of Protestantism could republicanism 
flourish. As John Pinheiro has succinctly 
put it, Protestant was “white, civilized 
(i.e., republican), and American” whereas 
Catholic was “dangerous, uncivilized (i.e., 
unrepublican), and foreign” (Pinheiro 
2014: 9). 
In a similar vein, the Populists in the 
1880s and 1890s, promoted themselves 
as the “last significant expression of an old 
radical tradition” combining Jeffersonian 
egalitarianism, Jacksonian anti-privilege 
sentiments, and Lincolnian democracy 
(Clanton 1991: XVI). Theirs was a vision 
of a republic composed of independent 
producers and cultivators – a vision 
threatened with extinction by the rise of 
monopoly capitalism, both industrial and 
financial, and its collusion with the political 
establishment to the detriment of ordinary 
people. The mission of the People’s 
Party was, as one of its major political 
leaders put it, to assure that government 
functioned “to the mutual benefit of all 
the people” and served “to advance the 
common weal” (Peffer 1893: 665). It is for 
this reason that contemporary observers, 
unlike their detractors a few decades later, 
characterized the Populist demands as 
radical and “socialistic” (Walker 1894: 
101). There is now broad agreement with 
Walter Dean Burnham’s assessment of the 
Populists as “the last significant American 
challenge to industrial capitalism as a 
system of social, economic, and political 
power” (Burnham 1891: 195-196). Too 
radical for their time, the Populists were 
swept away following the crucial defeat 
in the presidential election of 1896. 
Their ideas, however, proved highly 
resilient, exerting a major influence on the 
progressive agenda of the first decades of 
the twentieth century.
This was also true for Boulangist populism 
in France – only in a different direction. 
In the early 1890s, leading Boulangists, 
such as Maurice Barrès and Paul 
Déroulède, banked on nativism, directed 
against foreign workers, in the service of a 
nationalist ideology that sought to reverse 
national decline and decadence and 
create a new sense of identity for a severely 
unsettled nation. The vast majority of the 
Boulangist deputies came from the radical 
left; many of them not only considered 
themselves socialists, but voted with the 
Socialists on social issues. At the same 
time, they were nationalists on political 
issues, which led Zeev Sternhell and 
others to characterize them as precursors 
of “national socialism” and, more 
contentiously, protofascism (Sternhell 
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1974; Doty 1970: 269). Ideologically, the 
influence of Barrès can be traced all the 
way to the Front national, both under Jean-
Marie Le Pen and his daughter (Fieschi 
2004: 139; Kauffman 2016).
3. Contemporary radical 
right-wing populism
Similar to the major populist movements of 
the nineteenth century, today’s successful 
radical right wing parties in advanced 
liberal democracies have propagated a 
discourse designed to mobilize both anti-
elite resentment and nativist sentiments. 
During the past few decades, however, 
the balance between populism and 
nativism has increasingly shifted towards 
the latter. This, however, was not always 
the case. The initial success of major 
radical right-wing populist parties in 
the 1980s and early 1990s was to a 
large extent the result of their ability to 
mobilize widespread disenchantment 
with the political establishment and elites 
in general. In response, radical right-
wing parties such as the Front national 
(FN), the FPÖ and the Lega Nord (LN) 
adopted a populist discourse that allowed 
them to promote themselves as the (sole) 
advocates of the concerns and interests 
of ordinary people and the only “true” 
promoters of “genuine” democracy. 
The Front national’s programme of 1985 is a 
case in point. The first chapters abound with 
populist tropes. Chapter I, tellingly entitled 
“La démocratie confisquée,” starts with the 
claim that while France is a democracy, the 
reality looks different. In reality, democracy 
has been “confiscated” by an oligarchy 
which could care less about the concerns of 
“the people.” This oligarchy consists of a 
“small minority of high officials, teachers, 
representatives of the media, and union 
leaders” representing a “’new class’ 
without legitimacy derived from the polls” 
(Front national 1985 17: 20-21). As long 
as the oligarchy maintains its hold on the 
levers of power, it will remain in a position 
to stifle the “profound aspirations” of the 
French people and ignore their concerns 
(36-37). In response, the FN markets itself 
as a political force intent on disempowering 
the elite (primarily via a market-friendly 
program designed to reduce the scope of 
the state and thus deprive the oligarchy of 
the economic foundation of its power) and 
“give people back their voice” (rendre la 
parole au peuple) – the title of chapter III 
of the program (35). Unlike the “political 
class”, characterized as “the new class” 
(la nouvelle classe) and a “closed caste” 
(une caste fermée), the FN, or so the 
program asserts, has “confidence in the 
people” (20, 34, 42). This assessment 
culminates in the FN’s call for the 
introduction of direct democracy as 
an “indispensable complement to 
representative democracy” (43). A decade 
later, the fight against “l’Établissement” 
in the name of “le peuple” is central to 
the FN’s populist mobilization (Boily 
2005: 42-44). For a brief moment, Jean-
Marie Le Pen even toys with the idea of 
a “populist front” bringing together the 
main anti-establishment movements 
(principally Philippe de Villiers on the right 
and Bernard Tapie on the left), which he 
quickly discards however (Birnbaum 
2010: 268-269). 
Similar populist narratives inform the 
discourse of a number of other major 
radical right-wing parties in the 1980s 
and 90s. The FPÖ, for instance, under 
the new leadership of Jörg Haider (1986), 
embarks on a protracted campaign 
against Austria’s elite power-sharing 
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arrangements (Proporz), characterized 
as a closed system promoting clientilism, 
patronage and corruption. He proclaims 
as the party’s main goal to liberate the 
Austrians from the shackles of corporatism 
and consociationalism and restore them 
to the center of Austrian politics as 
independent and responsible citizens 
(Haider 1993: 29; 1994). And he explicitly 
accepts the charge of populism for his 
party because, as he puts it, “we think 
with the head of the citizens, because we 
fight for their approval, because – unlike 
the established parties – we don’t rely on 
power and pressure designed to make 
them compliant” (Haider 1992: 6). 
The same logic holds for the beginnings 
of the LN as a significant actor in Italian 
politics in the early 1990s. Its leading 
figure, Umberto Bossi, cultivates an 
image that appeals to the “low” in 
northern Italian society, using coarse and 
vulgare language (La Lega c’e la duro) to 
mark himself off from the “politichese” 
(convoluted language, incomprehensible 
for ordinary people) characteristic of 
the Roman political establishment. Like 
Haider, Bossi envisions nothing short 
of a fundamental transformation of the 
post-war Italian socioeconomic and 
political system to dismantle the Roman 
partitocracy and put an end to clientilism 
and corruption (Boss and Vimercati 
1993). The enemy is Roma ladrona (the 
big thief), which robs the hard-working 
and enterprising northern Italians of their 
just rewards in order to buy support at 
the polls in the South of the country and 
thus perpetuate its state of dependency 
on state assistance (assistenzialismo). 
The LN’s assault on assistenzialismo, 
in turn, reflects the movement’s strong 
“producerist” bent, which can also be 
found in the rhetoric of the FPÖ, the 
Front national, and the populist right in 
Scandinavia. This is a classical populist 
trope, which divides society into two groups 
– the productive and the unproductive 
(particularly the “symbolic specialists 
in current sociological parlance), with 
populists defending the interests of the 
former.3 As such, it jibes perfectly with the 
logic of polarization central to populism.
It was the radical right’s adoption of 
populism, which to a large degree explains 
its initial surge at the polls. The breakthrough 
of the Danish Fremskridtspartiet in the 
“landslide election” of 1973, for instance, 
owed much to Mogens Glistrup’s ability to 
mobilize widespread political disaffection 
with, and distrust of, the political 
establishment and resentment against 
public servants, who he “accused of being 
unproductive and overpaid papershufflers” 
(Nielsen 1976: 147). Similarly, the FPÖ’s 
fulminant ascent in the 1980s and 1990s 
was largely the result of two factors: Haider’s 
charismatic personality and the party’s 
ability to market themselves as dogged 
political muckrakers and uncompromising 
fighters against abuses of power and 
privileges (Plasser and Ulram 2000: 228-
230). The same holds true for the upsurge 
of support for the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 
in the election of 2002, a few days after 
Fortuyn’s assassination. The flamboyant 
gay enfant terrible of Dutch politics tapped 
into a “clear reservoir” of “disaffection 
from politics” and from the political 
3. Producerism dates all the way back to the 
nineteenth century.  Gilded-Age skilled workers 
in the United States, for instance, “believed in the 
redemptive powers of their own labor” and “took 
pride in themselves and their participation in the 
honorable army of producers – people who pro-
duced economic value through their own efforst, 
unlike the ‘parasites’ (lawyers, bankers, brokers) 
who merely manipulated abstractions or other 
people’s money” (Lears 2009: 74).
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establishment among Dutch voters, which 
the LPF successfully mobilized (Bélanger 
and Aarts 2006: 16). The adoption of an 
anti-elite rhetoric allowed even right-wing 
extremist parties with a neo-Nazi past, 
such as the Sverigedemokraterna, to (at 
least partially) overcome stigmatization by 
promoting themselves as the only “true 
democrats” (Hellström and Nilsson 2010: 
60). 
4. Contemporary radical 
right-wing nativism
It was not before long, however, that the 
question of migrants and immigration 
moved to the center of radical right-wing 
populist mobilization. The focus was 
primarily on the purportedly deleterious 
impact of migrants on the labor market, 
on the social welfare state, and on 
public security. As a flyer of the German 
Republikaner (who for a short period in 
the early 1990s posed a serious challenge 
to the political establishment) put it quite 
succinctly: “Save the welfare state: Expel 
bogus refugees! Eliminate unemployment: 
Stop immigration! Fight against crime: 
Deport foreign criminals!” (Betz 1996: 
367). This was a rudimentary type of 
socioeconomic nativism, which found 
its ideal-typical expression in the Vlaams 
Blok slogans “Eigen volk eerst” (the own 
people first) and “Uit Zelfverdediging” 
(out of self-defense). It was reminiscent of 
the visceral nativist rhetoric of nineteenth-
century nativism, which had informed the 
programs of antebellum Know Nothings 
and 1890s Boulangists alike (The FN 
slogan “La France aux Français” was first 
used by Barrès in his campaign for the 
1893 parliamentary election (Goodliffe 
2012: 31).
The mobilization of socioeconomic 
ressentiments went a long way to 
entrench radical right-wing populist 
parties particularly among lower-skilled 
workers in industry and services who felt 
threatened by competition from migrants 
willing to work for less. This was reflected 
in the progressive “proletarization” 
of the electoral base of these parties 
(Rydgren 2013). They increasingly filled 
the political space abandoned by the 
traditional social-democratic and socialist 
left, epitomized by François Mitterrand’s 
radical turn to “rigueur” and austerity 
from 1983, which arguably proved a 
substantial boon for the Front national. 
With the progressive tightening of the 
immigration regime in Western Europe, 
however, socioeconomic nativism quickly 
lost its traction. In response, radical right-
wing populist parties relatively quickly 
reframed their anti-foreigner discourse 
in cultural terms. This was reminiscent of 
American antebellum “symbolic nativism” 
-- a combination of civic republicanism 
and ethnoculturalism directed primarily 
against Irish Catholic immigrants 
(Schildkraut 2005: 169). It was based on 
the conviction that “only Anglo-Saxons 
possessed the moral and intellectual 
qualities required for democratic 
citizenship” and that “racial and cultural 
differences made certain aliens a threat 
to national cohesion and stability” (Citrin, 
Reingold and Green 1990: 1129). 
Politically, it informed the Know Nothings’ 
attempt at “symbolic exclusion” of Irish 
and other Catholic immigrants from the 
right to speedy naturalization.4 This was 
intended to prevent them from voting 
until they had become fully acculturated 
(the demand was for a twenty-one-
4. The term “symbolic exclusion” is borrowed 
from the sociology of taste (see Bryson 1996; 
Lizardo and Skiles 2016).
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year residency requirement before 
naturalization). A similar demand was 
made some forty years later in France by 
the Boulangist deputy Maurice Barrès. 
He argued that “only the second or third 
generation immigrant was rooted enough 
in the French ‘dead’ to be trusted with full 
citizenship” (Doty 1976: 189). 
Symbolic nativism is centered upon 
the defense of fundamental traditions, 
values, and institutions that define a 
community and its identity. On this basis, 
it justifies exclusion on grounds of cultural 
incommensurability and what Pierre-
André Taguieff has called the “right to 
difference” (Taguieff 1993-1994). This 
represents a departure from traditional 
notions of racial superiority to a new 
form of “cultural pluralism” based on the 
notion that all cultures are equally valid 
but not all compatible with each other. 
It is this “assertion of difference rather 
than any claim to superiority that lies at 
the heart of nativist logic,” which derives 
its discursive thrust from the simple 
“distinction between ‘better’ and ‘better 
for us’” (Michaels 1994: 39; 1992: 683). 
In another sense, too, symbolic nativism 
is “post-racist” because, unlike racism, it 
allows for acculturation and assimilation, 
a distinction already stressed by John 
Higham, the author of a classic study of 
American nativism (Higham 2000: 329). 
Thus the Know Nothings demanded that 
immigrants give up “their peculiarities and 
become American in feeling, in thought, 
and in devotion” to their new home before 
they could “be considered good citizens.” 
This, however, was a “matter of experience 
and education, not inheritance” (Knobel 
1981: 332). This is why some prominent 
nativists in the 1840s and 50s made 
the case for the virtue of extending full 
citizenship to African Americans. For, as 
one writer asked, who would “refuse the 
right of suffrage to the native-born, and 
bred, honest and intelligent man of color; 
while at the same time they actually force 
it upon the foreign-born and bred, vicious, 
ignorant, degraded ruffian” (Alfred Ely 
cited in Knobel 1981: 333). African 
Americans in the north agreed. In fact, 
in the 1880s, the anti-Catholic American 
Protective Association (A.P. A.), which 
for a time wielded significant influence in 
parts of the Republican Party, went out of 
its way to appeal to African Americans – 
albeit with rather limited success (Hellwig 
1982: 92). This does not mean, however, 
that African Americans were immune 
to the temptation of nativism. In fact, in 
the 1850s, African Americans in Boston 
petitioned “to keep Irish people from 
moving onto their street” (Rubin 1978: 
193). At the same time, however, African 
Americans were generally sympathetic to 
the plight of European and, later in the 
nineteenth century, Asian immigrants 
(Rubin 1978: 195; Hellwig 1982: 91).
Nativism is a “militantly defensive” political 
doctrine in the service of protecting a 
nation’s “cherished heritage” (Higham 
2000: 329). As such, nativism is intricately 
linked to the question of collective identity 
based on a shared common culture. 
Nativist parties respond to what has been 
shown to be a fundamental concern 
informing people’s negative attitudes 
toward immigration – the fear of a loss of 
identity as a result of being “overrun” by 
culturally alien foreigners (Mayda 2006; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).5 This is 
what accounted to a significant extent for 
5.  In Germany, for the past several years, about a 
third of the population have agreed with the state-
ment that the country, because of all those for-
eigners is “to a dangerous degree” überfremdet 
(«foreignized»).  See Decker, Kiess and Brähler, 
2016: 31.
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the dramatic rise of the Know Nothings in 
the years preceding the outbreak of the 
Civil War; and this is what accounts in 
large measure for the upsurge of support 
for radical right-wing populist parties 
and movements in advanced liberal 
democracies in recent decades. 
These parties and movements constitute 
to an overwhelming extent an expression 
of identitarian populism. However, whereas 
in the past, identity was largely conceived 
within the confines of a particular nation, 
today identity is construed no longer in 
“narrow national but in broader civilizational 
terms” (Brubaker 2017: 1193). This has 
allowed leading proponents of identitarian 
populism, such as Geert Wilders in the 
Netherlands, to establish networks with 
likeminded movements across and beyond 
Europe. The emphasis is on defending 
the “Judeo-Christian civilization” that is 
deemed to constitute one of the essential 
bases of Western culture and way of life. Yet, 
as a recent collected volume on populism 
and religion has pointed out, contemporary 
right-wing radical populist movements 
define Christianity not in terms of a “set 
of normative social and moral values,” but 
purely in terms of identity. Overwhelmingly 
secular, they approach Christianity not as 
a faith but as “a marker of identity.” Their 
primary concern is less with Christianity 
than with “Christendom” (Marzouki, 
McDonnell and Roy 2016: 79; 186). 
Under this banner, they have successfully 
merged traditionally liberal and traditionally 
socialist/social-democratic notions into a 
programmatic amalgam that has proven 
to appeal particularly to the popular strata 
(Akkerman 2005; Halikiopoulou, Mock and 
Vasilopoulou 2013; Betz and Meret 2012). 
The result is a combination of symbolic 
and economic nativism, with a strong 
preponderance of the former. To be 
sure, radical right-wing populist parties 
continue to appeal to widespread popular 
sentiments that immigrants represent an 
additional burden on the welfare state 
and/or that they are accorded preferential 
treatment compared to the native born. 
Today, a number of prominent radical 
right-wing populist parties, such as 
the Front national, the Lega Nord, and 
Wilders’s PVV, promote themselves as 
staunch defenders of a comprehensive 
welfare state – as long as its benefits are 
strictly reserved for natives, in line with 
the principle of “national preference” 
(Zaslove 2008; De Koster, Achterberg and 
Van der Waal 2013). It certainly would 
be short-sighted to dismiss the radical 
populist right’s socioeconomic positions 
as irrelevant, mere electioneering. The 
evolution of the Front national’s economic 
program since Marine Le Pen assumed 
the party’s leadership certainly suggests 
otherwise (Betz and Meret 2012).
In contemporary radical right-wing 
populist programmatic discourse, 
however, welfare-chauvinist positions 
play only a subordinate role compared to 
symbolic-nativist positions centered upon 
the question of Islam. The widespread 
fears and anxieties engendered by the 
rise of radical Islamism and Islamist 
extremism in its different guises in Europe 
and elsewhere have offered the radical 
populist right ample opportunities for 
mobilization, which they have been quick 
to seize. However, it would be a mistake to 
assume that it was only in the aftermath 
of September 11 that the radical populist 
right adopted the notion that Islam 
represents a “civilizational threat” to the 
West (Brubaker 2017: 1193). In fact, 
as early as 1990, Bruno Mégret, at the 
time the number two of the FN (délégué 
général), charged that Islam was “the 
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basis of a civilization that is incompatible 
with Europe’s Christian civilization” 
since it did not recognize the distinction 
between “the spiritual and the temporal,” 
i.e., between religion and politics (Mégret 
1990: 58-59). Two years later, the authors 
of a FN position pamphlet on immigration 
warned that Islam was “hardly compatible 
with the secular Western societies” 
because Islam was not only a religion 
but also a civilization whose basic rules 
(for instance with respect to inheritance) 
were “incompatible with French law” 
(Le Gallou and Olivier 1992: 23). Similar 
views were expressed by Filip Dewinter, 
the strongman of the Vlaams Blok, who 
charged in the mid-1990s that Islam was 
an “anti-Western religion” which was out 
“to conquer Europe;” and who added 
that Muslim immigrants had no interest 
in integration because “they despise 
our world as decadent and corrupt” 
(Dewinter cited in van den Brink 1996: 
120; 203). The German Republikaner, 
in turn, depicted the influx of Muslim 
migrant workers as a “conquest” by other 
means, comparable to the conquest of the 
Byzantine Empire by the Ottoman Turks 
(Schönhuber 1992). 
Since at the time, all three parties were 
considered right-wing extremist, their 
position on Islam were largely dismissed 
and ignored (Mudde 2000). It was not 
until Pim Fortuyn made the question of 
Islam the central issue in his campaign 
for the 2002 election for the Dutch 
parliament that symbolic nativism got a 
powerful boost (Brubaker 2017: 1194-
1997). Fortuyn managed to blend anti-
Islamism and the assault on “political 
correctness” with an adamant defense of 
gender equality, gay and lesbian rights, 
and fundamental Western values such as 
freedom of expression and the separation 
of church and state (Akkerman 2005). 
Fortuyn’s central charge against Islam 
was that it represented a “backward 
culture” that threatened to turn back 
the clock at a time when Dutch society 
had finally emancipated itself from the 
strictures of religious traditionalism (van 
der Veer 2006: 120). And the Dutch had 
no desire, as Fortuyn famously put it, “to 
start all over again with the emancipation 
of women and gays” (Fortuyn 2002). 
Fortuyn’s framing of the question of 
Islam worked because he couched his 
defense of progressive values (such 
as gay rights) in nationalist terms – as 
Dutch values. The same thing has 
happened in other countries of Western 
Europe, most notably Denmark, whose 
disenchantment with multiculturalism 
closely resembles that which happened 
in the Netherlands (Hervik 2014: 170). 
Fortuyn’s assassination a few days before 
the election cut short a promising political 
career; his “culturalist/civilizationalist” 
anti-Islamic discourse, however, had an 
enormous impact on the radical populist 
right. It allowed even the most extremist 
ethno-nationalist parties, such as the 
Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, to promote 
themselves as uncompromising defenders 
of Western, Enlightenment-inspired liberal 
values. Fortuyn’s framing of the question 
of Islam was ingenious because it allowed 
for a nationalist appropriation of universal 
values. In Fortuyn’s narrative, for instance, 
lesbian and gay rights were constructed 
as “exemplary of a Dutch ‘tradition of 
tolerance’” (Mepschen, Duyvendak and 
Tonkens 2010: 970). In France, after 
Marine Le Pen assumed the presidency of 
the Front national, she promoted herself 
as the champion of laïcité, which goes all 
the way back to the French Revolution. At 
the same time, she defended the notion 
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that France was a “secular country with 
Christian roots” whose culture could only 
but clash with that of Islam (Kauffman 
2016: 83). And in Austria, the FPÖ 
promoted itself as a party that defended 
a conception of humanity and society 
that, as the party’s general secretary put 
it, was “informed by Christianity and the 
Enlightenment” (Der Standard 2009). 
As the party leader, Christian Strache, 
charged during a colloquium on women’s 
rights in early 2017, the FPÖ was 
“apparently” the only party in Austria to 
oppose “burqa, forced veiling and genital 
mutilation” (FPÖ 2017).
During the past fifteen years, radical 
right-wing populist parties in Europe and 
elsewhere have largely converged around 
this “notion of a civilizational threat from 
Islam” (Brubaker 2017: 1193). Its central 
tropes are that Islam is not a religion but a 
totalitarian ideology that seeks to subvert 
liberal democracies on its way to global 
hegemony; that, as a result, Islam is 
fundamentally incompatible with Western 
democracy; and that Islam, therefore, 
constitutes, as Fortuyn’s heir Geert Wilders 
has put it, “the greatest political threat 
facing the West today” (Wilders 2012: 32). 
The political revival of Pauline Hanson 
in the 2016 federal election in Australia 
is perhaps the most striking evidence of 
the transnational diffusion of anti-Islamic 
symbolic nativism. Hanson burst on the 
Australian political scene in 1996 as a 
newly elected member of the House of 
Representatives. There, Hanson quickly 
established herself as a quintessential 
populist cum nativist, lashing out against 
Australia’s political establishment, multi-
culturalism, Aborigines, and Asian 
immigrants. Failing to secure her re-
election in 1998 and haunted by legal 
problems, she quickly disappeared from 
the media limelight. After lingering in 
oblivion for twenty years, Hanson made a 
stunning return to the center of Australian 
politics with an agenda that projected her 
as the defender of traditional Australian 
(white) Australian culture, values, and way 
of life against what she conjured up as a 
process of silent “Islamization of Australia” 
which she claimed was well underway (The 
Queensland Times 2016). Maintaining 
that Australia is a secular society “built 
on Christian values” Hanson’s party, One 
Nation, charges that Islam is an ideology 
which “has no place in Australian society 
if we are to live in a cohesive society” (One 
Nation, no date). With her nativist agenda, 
Hanson’s party won four pivotal seats in the 
Australian Senate. 
The symbolic-nativist agenda has 
provided contemporary radical right-wing 
populist parties such as One Nation with 
a “winning formula” because it resonates 
with significant segments of the voting 
public. Take, for instance, Donald Trump’s 
ban on immigrants from Muslim countries. 
Universally condemned by progressive 
media, it nonetheless seems to enjoy 
significant public support. In Australia, 
for instance, in 2016, almost half of 
respondents supported the measure 
(Lewis 2016). Critics were quick to attack 
the survey methodology. Yet a cross-
national study from Europe for Chatham 
House largely confirmed the plausibility of 
the Australian findings. The ten-country 
survey found more than 50 percent of 
respondents agreeing with the statement 
that “All further immigration from Muslim 
countries should be halted” – about the 
same number of respondents who thought 
that “European and Muslim ways of life are 
not irreconcilable” (Raines, Goodwin and 
Cutts 2017: 21). Surveys from individual 
countries come to similar results. In 
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Germany, for instance, between 2009 and 
2016, the number of respondents who 
thought that immigration from Muslim 
countries should be completely stopped 
increased from 21 to 41 percent. The 
number of ‘Germans who felt that, as a 
result of the growing Muslim presence, 
they were “strangers in their own country” 
increased from 30 to 50 percent (Decker, 
Kiess and Brähler 2016: 50). Under the 
circumstances, the dramatic gains of 
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in 
a number of regional elections in 2016 
should hardly come as a surprise, given its 
strong nativist positions (Horn 2016). In 
the United States, in 2015, more than half 
of the population thought that Islam was 
«at odds with American values and way of 
life,» and even more (58 percent) viewed 
Islam unfavourably (Douthat 2015). Given 
these sentiments, Trump›s «Muslim ban» 
initiatives certainly made political sense.
5. On the logic of nativist 
mobilization
In the current debate on populism it is 
generally assumed that –with the notable 
exception of Latin America– populism 
and nativism go hand in hand. For 
the contemporary radical right, this is 
certainly the case. Although these parties 
are generally not opposed to democracy 
–in fact, more often than not they promote 
themselves as staunch advocates 
of “genuine” democracy– what they 
envision is to replace liberal, multicultural 
democracy with a form of “ethnocracy.” 
This is a system that extends “civil and 
political rights to individuals and some 
collective rights to minorities,” but which 
defines the state in terms of a “’core ethnic 
nation’” based on “historical claims and 
cultural symbols steeped in mythology 
over the distant and not so distant past” 
as justification for the pursuit of policies 
that guarantee ethno-national dominance 
-- economically, culturally, and politically 
(Smooha 1997: 199-200; Mostov 1996: 
36). The foundation of ethnocracy is 
intricately intertwined with the question 
of identity. In its populist nativist guise, 
most prominently promoted by the Front 
national, it finds its expression in the 
appeal to what Zygmunt Bauman has 
characterized as “’historical identity’ 
transmitted through birth” (Bauman 
1995: 542). This was already recognized 
by Maurice Barrès, the celebrated writer, 
Boulangist deputy and late nineteenth-
century maitre-penseur of an organicist 
conception of national identity. For Barrès, 
being part of a national community (such 
as le peuple français) means “internalizing 
the legitimacy, over the long haul, of an 
established order, means accepting to 
conform to tradition.” Being “a people” 
means seeing oneself as a community 
that has already been established” and 
of which one is part (Krulic 2007: 7). 
Failing to see or, worse, rejecting this 
reality means falling victim to “uprooting” 
(déracinement). 
This is what lies at the heart of the 
political cleavage that informs virtually 
all advanced liberal democracies today: 
a conflict between an allegedly rootless 
cosmopolitan liberal elite that promotes 
cultural choice and variety and resists any 
homogenizing pressures and the rest of 
the population, which clings to traditional 
values and a narrowly-circumscribed 
notion of national identity (see, for 
instance, Inglehart and Norris 2016). 
This cleavage is hardly new. It already 
informed late nineteenth-century conflicts 
in France, pitting the defensive promoters 
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of a “société fermée” (closed society) 
exemplified by Maurice Barrès against 
the liberal advocates of an open society, 
inherited from the French Revolution. 
The success of radical right-wing parties 
and movements derives to a large extent 
from their ability to mobilize “ordinary 
people” against –as Alex Frankel has 
facetiously put it– a big-city “multi-
ethnic cabal of feminists, refugee-
loving environmentalists, nanny-state 
lovers, chardonnay socialists, ungodly 
pro-abortionists, homosexuals, big-city 
Jewish bankers, and cosmopolitan latte-
sipping liberals” who “look down on 
authentic, hardworking people” (Frankel 
2016).6 Contemporary radical right-wing 
populist parties score big in elections 
when they manage to convince ordinary 
people that it is people like them (i.e., 
the hardworking people) who ultimately 
have to foot the bill for the misguided 
multicultural experiments concocted by 
an elite completely removed from reality.
The affinity between populism and nativism 
is obvious. The logic of populism rests on 
the demarcation between elite and “the 
people,” hailed as endowed with superior 
wisdom and virtue. The logic of nativism 
rests on the demarcation (inherent in any 
form of nationalism) between those on the 
inside and those on the outside, between 
foreigners and the native-born, hailed as 
bearers of a culturally superior civilization 
(Anglo-Saxon Protestantism in the case of 
the Know Nothings, French culture in the 
case of Maurice Barrès, “Western culture” 
in the case of Geert Wilders).7 This is the 
6.  This is not to say that “the elite” does not 
look down on ordinary people.  See, for instance, 
Traub 2016.
7. For Barrès see Sourcy 1967: 72; The follow-
ing excerpt from a Wilders speech held in 2011 
in Rome is exemplary of the “civilizationalism” 
logic behind slogans such as that promoted 
by the Vlaams Bloks in 2001, “aanpassen 
of terugkeren” (assimilate or go back), 
meant to prevent the “loss of identity” of 
the Flemish people (Vlaams Blok 2001: 6). 
For assimilation means nothing less than a 
process of adopting the (superior) culture of 
the “host.” This was the logic of the twenty-
one year waiting period the Know Nothings 
demanded for Catholic immigrants – time 
to “allow them” to absorb and imbibe the 
essence of the American creed. When 
populist and nativist tropes are brought 
together, as was paradigmatically the case 
first with the Know Nothings, then Maurice 
Barrès (when he was a Boulangist deputy) 
and, a century later, with Jean-Marie Le 
Pen’s Front national, it forms an explosive 
ideological amalgam with considerable 
mobilization potential. 
Brexit is a case in point. Brexit was to a 
large extent an expression of intensified, 
wide-spread “Euroscepticism” triggered 
by mass immigration from the poorer 
European Union countries, which was 
not only perceived as an economic, 
but also a cultural threat (Goodwin and 
Milazzo 2015: 6). As Goodwin and Ford 
have put it, in Britain, “the strongest and 
most inflexible opposition to migration has 
central to contemporary symbolic nativism on 
the radical populist right: “Ordinary people are 
well aware that they are witnessing a population 
replacement phenomenon. Ordinary people feel 
attached to the civilization which their ancestors 
created. They do not want it to be replaced by 
a multicultural society where the values of the 
immigrants are considered as good as their own. 
It is not xenophobia or islamophobia to consider 
our Western culture as superior to other cultures 
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come from voters who see it as a source 
or symbol of rapid social change that 
threatens traditional identities and values.” 
(Goodwin and Ford 2017: 21). Although 
far from all of these voters ended up 
casting their vote for Nigel Farage’s UKIP, 
the party proved particularly successful 
in attracting these voters (Dennison and 
Goodwin 2015: 178). In the referendum, 
sociocultural polarization largely explains 
the variance between “remainers” and 
“leavers”: The local jurisdictions where 
the remain vote was strongest, were 
overwhelmingly in London (and Scotland, 
but for different reasons) or in areas with 
large universities (Goodwin and Ford 
2017: 25). Brexit, as Craig Calhoun has 
put it, was above all a “mutiny against the 
cosmopolitan elite” centered in London 
(Calhoun 2016). This was also true for 
the Trump election, which was to a large 
extent a mutiny of the “heartland” against 
the “coastal elites” (see, for instance, 
Masciotra 2016; Merry 2016).
The evidence advanced in this article 
suggests that nativism, both economic and 
symbolic, plays a significant role in populist 
mobilization. The success of contemporary 
radical right-wing populist mobilization 
in advanced liberal democracies is, to 
a large extent, a result of these parties’ 
ability to mobilize widespread anxieties 
and ressentiments associated with the 
presence and growing visibility of Muslim 
minorities – sentiments and reactions 
reminiscent of those against Catholics 
in the antebellum United States. Like 
their nineteenth-century antecedents, 
today’s nativists appeal to a panoply of 
political alienation and disenchantment, 
democratic distemper and ethnocultural 
ressentiments that transcend class 
differences and sustain a populist project 
centered upon a combination of anti-
establishment rhetoric and identitarian 
politics. Unlike nineteenth-century populist 
movements, however, today’s radical right-
wing populist parties and movements have 
shown a remarkable political resilience, 
not least because their nativist program 
continues to resonate among substantial 
segments of the electorate. 
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